



Migration &  
Sicherheit  
in der Stadt

Working Paper Nr. 5 (draft)  
**Migration and Safety in the City**  
An international View

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Münster, Februar 2020

Ein Verbundforschungsprojekt der Partner



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## Editorial (dt.)

Die Aufnahme und Integration einer großen Zahl von Migrant\*innen und Geflüchteten stellt Städte und Gemeinden seit jeher vor große Herausforderungen. Diese betreffen nicht nur die Bereiche Arbeit, Wohnung oder Bildung, sondern auch die Sicherheit. Das Projekt „Migration und Sicherheit in der Stadt“ untersucht, ob Formen von Integration und/oder Segregation in migrantisch geprägten Quartieren Konflikte und Kriminalität vermindern oder erhöhen und falls ja, wie. Das Forschungsprojekt arbeitet mit einem umfassenden und interdisziplinären wissenschaftlichen Ansatz (Kriminologie, Soziologie, Politikwissenschaft, Rechtswissenschaft, Kommunikationswissenschaft und Ethik). Die Ergebnisse dieses breit angelegten Projektes sollen die verschiedenen Akteure helfen, ihre interinstitutionelle und zielgruppenorientierte Zusammenarbeit lokaler Sicherheitsarbeit in Wohnquartieren weiter zu entwickeln.

Das Projekt untersucht die Sicherheitsarbeit in vier deutschen Städten mit jeweils zwei Quartieren. Die Untersuchungsfragen, die wir hier betrachten, sind aber nicht nur relevant für deutsche Kommunen, sondern auch für andere Länder mit unterschiedlichem Rechtsrahmen und verschiedenen Handlungsstrategien von Kommunen und Polizeibehörden. Deshalb wollten wir auch Einblicke gewinnen, wie andere Länder die Sicherheitsarbeit in multiethnischen Stadtteilen gestalten. Wie werden dort die Herausforderungen beschrieben. Wie wird mit Integration und Segregation in Wohngebieten umgegangen? Welche Ziele der Sicherheitsarbeit werden als wichtig eingeschätzt? Wie gestaltet sich die Kooperation von Institutionen und Organisationen sowie mit den Bewohner\*innen (insbesondere der migrantischen Bevölkerung)? Sind besondere Sicherheitsstrategien erkennbar?

Wir sind sehr froh, Kolleg\*innen aus vier Ländern von zwei Kontinenten gewinnen konnten, an unserem Projekt mitzuwirken, ihre Gedanken und Ideen einzubringen, die einerseits von den sehr unterschiedlichen Traditionen und Migrationsgeschichten in den jeweiligen Ländern geprägt sind, andererseits auch durch die verschiedenen professionellen und akademischen Hintergründe der Autor\*innen beeinflusst werden.

Recht weit weg von Deutschland ist Neuseeland. Die Geschichte des modernen Neuseeland ist eine Geschichte der Einwanderung. Und weiterhin ist das Land ein Migrationszielland für Menschen aus aller Welt. Dolapo Fakuade und Olusimbo Ige sind selbst nicht in Neuseeland geboren und haben persönliche Migrationserfahrung. Die anhaltende Zuwanderung von Migranten nach Europa in den letzten Jahrzehnten hat die Sorge verstärkt, wie mit diesen Neuankömmlingen am besten umgegangen werden kann. In diesem Artikel wird die Literatur zu Segregation und Integration von Migranten untersucht und der Zusammenhang zwischen Segregation und Konflikten, Problemen der öffentlichen Ordnung oder Kriminalität in der Gaststadt untersucht. Neuseeland wird als Fallstudie herangezogen Integration und Minimierung krimineller Aktivitäten. Die möglichen Folgen der Segregation von Migranten in einem Industrieland werden diskutiert. Ergebnisse in der Literatur belegen, dass die öffentliche Wahrnehmung von Bedrohung und Kriminalität durch Migranten unbegründet ist und die Trennung von Migranten in Orte mit geringen sozioökonomischen Chancen langfristig zu Konflikten und sozialen Störungen führen kann.

Colin Rogers aus Wales nimmt einen anderen Blick auf die Zusammenhänge von Migration und Sicherheit in der Stadt. Nicht erst seit den Brexit-Debatten wird im Vereinigten Königreich über Migration gestritten. Neben der mehr oder minder gut organisierten Zuwanderung aus der Europäischen Union sowie der Kriterien gestützten Zuwanderung aus dem weiteren Ausland gibt es die so genannte illegale Zuwanderung. Schon mehrere Jahre ist dies Gegenstand der öffentlichen und politischen Diskussion, die zunehmend feindlich und abwehrend wurde. Eine Konsequenz war die Zunahme von Hasskriminalität gegenüber Fremden. Colin Rogers diskutiert die Gründe für diesen Anstieg und die Anforderungen diese Kriminalität zu bekämpfen. Er erkennt einen Bedarf an Unterstützungsnetzwerken in den Gemeinden, um Vertrauen aufzubauen und Integration zu fördern.

Die Niederlande haben einige ähnliche Strukturen, Prozesse und Entwicklungen wie Deutschland. Und so ist es interessant die häufig verschiedenen Lösungen für ähnliche Problemlagen in den Ländern zu vergleichen. Wie Deutschland hatten auch die Niederlande in den 1960er Jahren so genannte Gastarbeiter aufgenommen und standen vor den Herausforderungen der Integration. Probleme traten in Nachbarschaften und Quartieren auf, wenn Menschen verschiedener Kulturen zusammenlebten. Doch es wurde auch als Problem gesehen, wenn Angehörige der ethnischen Minderheiten „eigene“ Quartiere aufbauten, da dies im Widerspruch zum Integrationsziel stand. Für einige Zeit wurde das Konzept der „Verteilung“ als Problemlösungsansatz gesehen. Wohnungspolitik wurde dann auch verstanden als Sicherheitspolitik und Integrationspolitik. Aber auch dieses Konzept war nicht problemlos und stieß auch auf Widerspruch durch die Bewohnerschaft in Stadtteilen. Anke van der Zijl und Ronald van der Waal beschreiben das Konzept der Verteilung, die Probleme mit dem Ansatz und die Möglichkeiten damit Integration zu fördern sowie Kriminalität und soziale Konflikte zu mindern.

Mein besonderer Dank gilt den Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die sich bereit erklärten, uns über die Problemdeutungen und den Ideen zur Verbesserung der Sicherheit in ihren Städten und migrantisch geprägten Wohnquartieren zu informieren.

*Prof. Dr. Bernhard Frevel*

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## Editorial (en)

Reception and integration of migrants has always been a challenge for cities and villages. This doesn't only regard fields of work, housing and education, but also matters of safety and security. The research project "Migration and Safety in the City" explores whether and how integration / segregation in neighbourhoods, which are characterized by migrants and a plurality of social groups, may decrease or increase conflicts, public order problems or crime. A consortium of five universities and the Federal Criminal Police Office analyses the practice of local authorities, police and civil society organisations in the field of policing and integration. The different views of all contributing stakeholders in the neighbourhood and community are of importance – especially of the residents. The research project works with a comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach of different sciences (criminology, sociology, political science, legal science, communication science and ethics). The results of the study with a broad look shall enable the different stakeholders to improve the interinstitutional and target group-oriented collaboration in the field of local safety in residential quarters.

The project analyses the policing in four German cities with each two quarters. The questions we put into focus are not only relevant in Germany but also in other countries with different legal framework and different strategies of municipalities and police authorities. Therefore we are interested in insights in safety policy in multi-ethnic communities in other countries. How can the challenge be described? How do people and authorities deal with segregation and integration in residential areas? Which aims in the safety policy are important? What can be said about the collaboration of institutions/organisations and also with the residents (especially the migrants)? Are there specific safety and policing strategies to be mentioned?

We are very happy that we could motivate colleagues from four countries on two continents to contribute to our project and to bring in thoughts and ideas which are influenced by the different traditions and histories of immigration and integration in their respective countries, and also from various professional and academic backgrounds of the authors.

Quite far away from Germany is New Zealand. The history of the modern New Zealand is a history of immigration, and still this country is a destination country for people all around the world. *Dolapo Fakuade and Olusimbo Ige* themselves are not born in NZ and have personal experience with migration. The continued surge of migrants to Europe over the last few decades has heightened concern on how best to handle these new arrivals. The paper reviews literature on migrant segregation versus integration and explores the link between segregation and conflicts, public order problems or crime in the host city. New Zealand is used as a case study. Findings highlight that each step of the resettlement process is designed to encourage integration and minimize criminal activity. The potential consequences of segregation of migrants in any developed country is discussed. Findings in literature support that the public perception of threat and crime by migrants is unfounded and migrant segregation into locations with low socio-economic opportunities may predispose to conflict and social disorder in the long term.

*Colin Rogers* from Wales provides a different perspective on the relation of migration and safety in the city. Not only since the Brexit debates there was a discussion about migration to the United Kingdom. Beside a more or less organised migration within the European Union and a migration based on awarded points as an entry tariff for Non-EU-people there is also the so-called illegal migration. For several years the public and political debate about migration became more and more hostile and rejecting. A consequence of this trend was a growing number of hate crimes against migrants. Colin Rogers discusses the reasons for this increase, and also the requirements to combat this crime and to protect migrants. He sees a necessity for support networks in communities, building trust and granting integration.

The Netherlands have some common structures, processes and developments with Germany. And so, it is very interesting to compare the often-different solutions to quite similar problems. As Germany the Netherlands experienced the migration of so-called guest workers in the 1960s and the challenges of integration. Some problems occurred in the neighbourhoods when people from different cultures lived together. But it was also seen as a problem when ethnic minorities built “own” quarters, as this stood in contrast to the idea of integration. For some time, the concept of “spreading” was seen as a solution of the problem. Housing policy was also understood as a security policy and integration policy. But this concept was not without problems and not implemented without protest of citizens. *Anke van der Zijl* and *Ronald van der Waal* describe the concept of spreading, the problems with this concept and its chances to increase integration and decrease crime and social conflicts.

I would like to thank the colleagues from the four countries that they informed us about the problem definitions and the different ideas how to improve safety and security in the cities and the neighborhoods. It's very appreciated!

*Prof. Dr. Bernhard Frevel*

Coordinator of the *migsst*-project

# Accelerating Migrant Integration: Lessons from New Zealand

*Dolapo Fakuade and Olusimbo Ige*

## *Introduction*

There is nothing new about migration. Throughout history, there have been accounts of migrants and refugees leaving their home countries to start new lives in other locations in search of work, better living conditions, educational opportunities, or protection against persecution and other threats to their life or liberty (OHCHR, 2019). However, there has been an upward trend in the number of migrants and refugees since 2010. Current numbers of international migrants stand at 272 million globally, an increase of 51 million since 2010 (UN, 2019). In 2019, Europe had the largest number of international migrants (82 million), followed by Northern America (59 million) and Northern Africa and Western Asia (49 million). Forced migration has also risen, the global number of refugees and asylum seekers increased by about 13 million between 2010 and 2017. Northern Africa and Western Asia host the largest percentage (46%) of the global refugees and asylum seekers (UN, 2019). The 2019 International Migration and Displacement Trends and Policies Report to the G20 indicated that, by mid-2018, 7.3 million refugees out of the 25.7 million global refugee population were hosted in Europe (OECD, 2019).

The wave of media headlines and social media coverage around the world in the last few years has brought widespread concern and panic about hosting asylum seekers and migrants who are fleeing violence, disasters and poverty and seeking refuge in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Europe, and other countries (OHCHR, 2019). The protracted humanitarian crises around the world which continue to drive these displacements particularly in the Americas and Europe have contributed to fuel these concerns. Though such mass exodus to Europe is undesired by many European countries, the key question is how best to integrate these new arrivals into their host communities. This question has become a major political, societal and economic challenge in many countries.

If one out of every seven international migrants is below the age of 20 years and three out of every four are of working age (20-64 years) then the potential socio-economic contribution of migrants and refugees can be significant if done right (UN, 2019). Yet, the reality is that immigrants and refugees tend to have higher unemployment rates, lower occupational attainment and wages, and are least able to find and hold good jobs. This trend also continues across generations (Constant et al., 2009). Through the lens of integrated theory; social control and self-control theories, we examine literature for successful resettlement programs. We also explore New Zealand's over 70 years of experience in the resettlement of migrants of different types. Our aim is to provide new information on migrant integration and the potential consequences of segregation of migrants from host communities to guide other developed countries in their migrant resettlement efforts.

### *Migrant Integration or Segregation*

There is a distinction between migrants and refugees which is “choice”. While a migrant is someone who chooses to move, a refugee is someone who has been forced from their home (UNDES, 2016). Whether migration is voluntary or involuntary, developing association and ties with the host state assists with social integration. The ultimate goal of this process is assimilation and naturalization (acquiring the nationality of the country of asylum) with the expectation that migrants would progressively regain their social and economic independence (UNHCR, 2001). However, the process of local integration can be complex with several legal, economic, social and cultural barriers. Although integration research often focuses on changes the new arrivals make, integration is a two-process that requires significant effort from both the individual and the receiving society (Castles, et al., 2002).

Integration refers broadly to economic and social inclusion and participation and this depends on a supportive social context (Hynie, 2018). Whenever there are limited opportunities for economic and social participation, either because of existing policies or due to community attitudes, integration becomes difficult if not impossible. Perceptions of threat and economic burden, stereotypes, and lack of opportunities for positive interactions shape community welcome and limit integration (Hynie, 2018). Although in many countries the law allows refugees the same socio-economic rights as nationals, limited access to subsidized housing, unemployment, lack of recognition of academic and professional qualifications limit economic participation of immigrants (UNHCR, 2014). In Finland, Heikkilä and Peltonen (2002) found a growing frustration among immigrants due to a lack of job satisfaction or unemployment. Access to the labor market was more difficult for immigrants because of language barriers, prejudices among employers, lack of appreciation of foreign degrees and underemployment (Heikkilä and Peltonen, 2002). For many refugee and migrant populations, unemployment and underemployment are endemic and so is residential and social segregation (Iceland, 2014; Malmberg et al., 2018; UNHCR, 2014).

Long-term sustainable housing is one of the biggest hurdles in resettling in a new country (Flatau et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2002). Without affordable housing options, migrants and refugees tend to congregate in the poorest communities. This residential concentration of immigrants has been linked to feelings of social isolation and refugee-native conflict along several dimensions (Balkan et al., 2018; Nordregio, 2019; Iceland, 2014). In France, the residential concentration of ethnic minorities in the most deprived parts of cities quickly led to stigmatization even though this segregation was due to prejudice in the housing market (Simon, 1998). This spatial segregation and social disadvantage resulted in 'social breakdown' and social disorders with outbreaks of riots, gangs of youths fighting the police, burning cars, looting supermarkets and vandalizing facilities.

All of these conflicts occurred against a backdrop of low-income housing projects and urban marginalization (Simon, 1998). In a report on residential segregation John Iceland a Professor of Sociology and Demography noted, that "the concentration of ethnic, national origin or socioeconomic groups in particular neighbourhoods of a city or metropolitan area is widely perceived as the antithesis as successful immigrant integration" and "tends to be problematic when it overlaps with inequalities that persist across generations"(Iceland, 2014). In such

cases, feelings of social distance and alienation are reinforced especially among later generations (Rush, 2016).

In both Finland and Sweden there has been integration policy reform which has shifted the focus toward socio-economic parity with emphases on education, skills training, language attainment, and civic orientation of immigrants (Geddes, 2016). The consensus among researchers is that employment is the most important factor in integrating immigrants into society (Junnila, 2015). Employment and other factors that reinforces social bonds have been prioritised by New Zealand through its refugee and immigration strategy.

### *Barriers to Migrant Integration*

The reality of an aging and shrinking society, the reduction of the economic workforce and the shrinking funds for pensions are some of the factors that were expected to favour immigration in a country like Germany. However, Pausch (2016) highlights that the public perception that migrants are stealing jobs from German citizens, and that their presence leads to the Islamization of Germany and degrades German values such as high performance and punctuality have limited the receptivity to migrants and refugees. The receptivity of natives to migrant populations is often shaped by a complex interplay of social and economic interactions with the new arrivals and influenced by public discourse and the media (Constant et al., 2009).

Public perception is a core aspect of integration of any minority group or migrants into a community (Trebbe and Schoenhagen, 2011). The feeling and perception of the migrant's identity, stereotypes and openness to inclusion by the host communities are all important considerations in the pathway to integration (Nordquist, 2001). Perceptions are not formed only through face-to-face communications or group interactions, but in current times the media framing of immigrants has impacted public perceptions (Trebbe and Schoenhagen, 2011). Literature abound on the negative portrayal of immigrants by the media and how these inaccurate narratives impact public perception. D'Haenens et al. (2000) explained the dissatisfaction of migrants in the Netherlands with their public perception, Mahtani (2008) described perceived mis and underrepresentation of Iranian and Chinese minorities in Canadian communities. Hafez (2002) and (Hammeran et al. 2007) relayed the concerns of Turkish migrants in Germany over inadequate and stereotyped depiction by the Germans. When protected from negative public perception, refugees and migrants in Europe and other developed countries are more likely to integrate rather than self-segregate.

There is a common perception that minorities self-segregate. While it may be true that immigrants of the same ethnic origin often prefer living close to each other, it becomes problematic when this segregation is a reflection of social and economic exclusion (Simon, 1998). Research also shows that immigrants who live in segregated areas have fewer contacts with natives compared to those living in mixed areas and thus have more difficulty integrating (Emerson et al., 2002). Social contact outside of the work environment improves intergroup relations and leads to a decrease in prejudice and conflict (Rubin et al., 2012). When immigrants develop social ties with natives they also get access to their social capital and this facilitates both economic and cultural integration (Vollebergh et al., 2017). A study of adult male immigrants in Canada found that interaction with natives helped immigrants to find

employment on a wider job market (Kanas and van Tubergen, 2009) and to learn the local language of the host society (Chiswick and Miller, 2001).

However, access to social capital and employment does not prevent nor protect migrants from racial and religious discrimination in settlement cities. Migrants and refugees have need to grapple with racial profiling and perceptions of risk and crime by natives. Consequently, migrants may become victims of "institutionalized exclusion" in their adoptive cities including exclusion from housing, social welfare and public safety protections (Lu and Song, 2006).

In many countries, refugees have also become victims of violence, Amnesty International has reported violence and abuse against refugees and migrants along Balkan Route and how European governments are turning a blind eye to the assaults of asylum seekers by the Croatian police (Amnesty International, 2019). Physical harassment, detention, and deportation to other countries where refugees risk greater persecution have become commonplace even in Western countries (Loescher, 2002). Police and security forces arbitrarily harass, detain, and arrest refugees. In San Diego in the US, officers have shot refugees with mental health issues and police officers continue to use unnecessarily rapid, violent responses with refugees and this has become rampant. A police officer reported that 'I have had Syrian clients ask, 'Am I safe here?' " because rocks have been thrown at them or finger pointed like a gun at them (Jackman, 2016). When the connection between security and migration is highlighted by the media or politicians, it is rarely with reference to threats faced by refugees in the process of seeking asylum (Loescher, 2002).

### *Migrants and Crime*

The link between Immigration and crime has become of interest to many scholars with the rise in nationalist and xenophobic sentiments (Pocock and Chan, 2018). Extant research suggests that while the fear of crime increases in host populations with the arrival of immigrant populations this is not supported by actual crime data (Hooghe and de Vroome, 2016; Nunziata, 2015). Media framing has also erroneously depicted immigrants as crime-prone further increasing the fear natives have of immigrants (Harris and Gruenewald, 2019). However, research across Europe and the US has not provided consistent evidence that immigration has caused a crime problem across countries (Bell et al., 2012; Crocitti, 2014). In the US, for instance, different studies have demonstrated that neither legal nor undocumented immigrants committed more crimes than native-born residents based on a review of the rates of incarceration (Butcher and Piehl, 2007; Doleac, 2017). Findings have also shown that in places where immigration has grown, violent and property crime have generally decreased (Misra, 2019) and youth born abroad were also observed to be significantly less likely than native-born youth to be criminally active (Doleac, 2017). A study conducted on immigration in the UK found that immigrants had no effect on violent crime; arrest rates were not different, and changes in crime could not be ascribed to crimes by immigrants (Bell et al., 2012).

In situations where immigrants become over-represented in prisons, it is due to socioeconomic factors (Hällsten et al., 2013) racial profiling (Parmar, 2014) and discrimination by the police and the judicial system (Colombo, 2013; West, 2018). Making sure that immigrants are able to legally find work appears to significantly reduce criminal activity for young, male and

poorly educated immigrants (Bell et al., 2012) particularly. A Danish experiment that randomly assigned immigrants to neighbourhoods found that those assigned to high crime neighbourhoods had increased criminal activity later in life, due to social interaction with criminals (Damm and Dustmann, 2014). Overall, the existing empirical evidence fails to substantiate a relationship between refugee migration and crime once socio-economic factors were accounted for (Fasani et al., 2019).

The question of if segregation of migrants, or migration integration into designated cities impacts conflicts, public order problems or crime still persists. Not from the dimension that migrants or refugees cause these problems, but whether their presence in certain cities regardless of social ties triggers public order problems, crime, conflicts or even resistance from natives or host cities.

Exclusion from social benefits and support could result in deviant behavior as explained by Hirschi's social control theory. Social control theory asserts that ties to family, school and other aspects of the society serve to diminish propensity for deviant behaviour. This is because crime tends to occur when social bonds are weakened or not well established (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Consistent with any control theory which seek to explain why people refrain from offending, criminality or any anti-social behaviour is considered as a possibility for all individuals in a society, but only avoided by those who maintain familial and social bonds.

While it may be inferred that migrants may have lost their familial bonds by 'moving', a further loss of social bonds in host countries because of "institutionalised exclusion" or negative public perception may make criminality a possibility. According to Henrich et al. (2005), attachment is a central component of social control theory, relating to parental, institutional and society ties especially community norms and religion. Thus, loss or lack of social bonds may result in low self-control which Gottfredson and Hirschi considered the key factor underlying criminal involvement. Self-control theory also known as general theory of crime is focused on internalised control rather than social control (Siegel and McCormick, 2006). According to them, crime is explained as a process that starts with (1) an impulsive personality to; (2) lack of self-control, (3) withering of social bonds, desperation and frustration; (4) the opportunity to commit crime; to (5) criminal or deviant behaviour (Siegel and McCormick, 2006: 286). When the social acceptance and bond is lacking, crime is seen as the means to obtain immediate gratification. Thus, ability to delay such short-term desires is linked to self-control often traced to childhood development, but one that indicates that opportunity changes to facilitate such deviant behaviour (Banyard and Quartey, 2006; Baron, 2003). One may argue that the quest for social bonds, as well as negative, inadequate or misrepresentation of migrant group by a host community, may lead an individual to gangs and criminal activities.

### *Police and Migrant Integration*

Developing a trusting relationship between law enforcement and the refugee or migrant community is necessary to address the fear, victimization, and social isolation that new arrivals face when they arrive in a new place. Law enforcement officers and other members of the

criminal justice system can help ease the integration process through efforts to better understand the complexities and trauma of the resettlement process and also an understanding of the native cultures of these migrants. True multi-cultural integration occurs when various cultures can interact with respect, interest, and caring during social activities (NCPC, 1994).

An example is the Tandem Partnership in Austria. To combat racial discrimination by police in Austria the International Centre for Cultures and Languages (ICCL) introduced tandem pairing, in which partners from two different cultures or different languages interact informally. This process helped police officers and immigrants to get to know each other on a personal level. The officer and the immigrant partner could go out to eat, watch a football match, take a walk or work on a project together. The officers learnt about their partner's family, job, and culture and were often surprised to find that the immigrant's life was not so different from their own. These partnerships helped reduce negative stereotypes about immigrants while at the same time helping immigrants to understand and be more comfortable around the police (ICCL, 2006.). In the US a similar initiative to foster better relations between the Albany Police Department and the immigrant community is being piloted. The community project will develop a language call line that officers can use when communicating with non-English-speaking individuals, hosting cultural events to bond with members of the communities, hiring part-time liaisons between the community and law enforcement, and providing cultural competency training for the police department (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2017).

### *A Case Study of New Zealand*

Safety, resettlement and immigration policy in New Zealand are all designed to encourage settlement at specific locations in the country based on community links, employment opportunities and access to services to help integration of migrants and refugees. Everyone selected for resettlement under the refugee Quota programme undergo comprehensive on and off-shore screening and assessment that focuses on credibility, security and risk (New Zealand Immigration, 2018). Required to meet health requirements, all quota refugees spend their first six weeks at Mangere refugee resettlement centre in Auckland where they are prepared for life and work in New Zealand communities. The reception programme at this centre prioritises settlement planning and orientation to life in the country, English language and preparing working age adults for employment and children for school (New Zealand Immigration, 2018). These priorities including health promotion facilitate and promote rapid integration into each one of the settlement cities in the country.

Refugees are settled in Auckland region, Hamilton, Palmerston North, Wellington region, Nelson, Christchurch, Dunedin and Invercargill. These cities are considered settlement locations in the country based on employment opportunities, access to services to help support integration, community links and presence of New Zealand Red Cross to support refugees as needed for up to 12 months after their arrival in their new cities. Other community-based organisations such as Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand (Wellington), Gleniti Baptist Church (Timaru), South West Baptist Church (Christchurch) and the Society of St Vincent de Paul (Nelson) all help refugees to settle into their new communities (New Zealand Immigration, 2018). New Zealand resettlement programme also provides an opportunity for community organisations

to be actively engaged in refugee resettlement and to build communities that welcome refugees. The wider public is however not a part of this process.

The government strategy launched in December 2012 focused on improving integration outcomes for refugees in the country by increasing the number of former refugees in paid employment, reducing the number receiving unemployment-related benefits and housing assistance. It also increased the number of refugees and former refugees in education and ensured better use of health services and access to mental health services. It is acknowledged that such levels of support promote integration and social bonds, perhaps only feasible due to the limited number of refugees accepted annually by New Zealand government. Through its refugee quota, New Zealand accepts only 1,500 people annually compared with the several thousand that enter other European countries. It can be inferred that New Zealand refugees and migrants possess stronger self-control and social bonds that facilitates integration and minimises propensity to crime due to the elimination of the factors that drive crime such as unemployment and social isolation. The rigorous screening and assessment process focuses on security, risk and credibility as well as ensuring resettlement in dedicated cities where community links and employment opportunities exist. We believe this streamlined process for the integration of migrants and refugees in New Zealand limits the possibility of any criminal activity.

### *Conclusion*

Unlike other categories of migrants, refugees do not usually have a job waiting for them, nor do they have the benefit of existing social networks to promote easy integration in their host countries (Heikkilä and Peltonen, 2002). The social situation of refugees must, therefore, be analyzed in the context of the respective host society and with regard to the living and working conditions of nationals for meaningful interventions. For refugees to reach and develop their full potential, marginalization must be prevented, and social cohesion and harmonious co-existence fostered (UNHCR, 2002). Communities that have undergone successful integration have endeavoured to create multi-cultural coalitions, instituting school programs to educate young people, establishing outreach and crime prevention programs, and encouraged refugees to work as employees or volunteers with the local law enforcement (NCPC, 1994). While there are several successful examples of migrant integration as demonstrated by New Zealand and other countries reviewed in this paper, most countries often overlook the role of host cities and the willingness of natives to change their stereotypes to accommodate migrants in order to reap the benefits of a welcoming integrative approach.

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# Migration and Safety - Reflections from England and Wales

*Colin Rogers*

## *Introduction*

The shift to a global economy, the removal in some instances of borders between countries and the rise in conflict between and within nations could be said to have provided a momentum in migration patterns across the world. The rise of more nationalistic and in some areas, a move to right wing politics, has seen the tightening of border controls, coupled with a rise in reported crime and abuses against immigrants especially in England and Wales. Immigration of course refers to the movement of people outside of their country of birth, to a country that they wish to settle in and become a permanent resident or gain formal citizenship.

England and Wales, like countries such as Australia, has an entry tariff, which involves points being awarded based on factors such as qualifications, earnings and English language skills. The focus, therefore, is on those individuals who are able to contribute to society so that, it is argued, immigration will strengthen the host country, not weaken it. Consequently, immigration in the UK has become more restrictive.

In addition, England and Wales is often presented as having particularly hostile attitudes toward immigration compared to other countries. Indeed, it has been argued that those opposed to immigration levels was a major factor behind the result of the 2016 UK referendum on membership in the European Union (Migration Policy Institute 2016).

In England and Wales, there, the question of the approach to the issue of migration and migrants is often depicted as being hostile (Ford 2012), yet this is perhaps a simplistic view, which stretches across the political spectrum, with far reaching effects for political discourse and policy making.

## *Public Opinion*

According to Ford et al (2015) when numbers of new immigrants rise, the public turns on immigration, propelling its importance as a topic to the political debating arena. Voters demand restrictions which prompts a government response (Ford et al 2015). However, simply equating a public interest in lower numbers with hostility does not take into account the subtlety of how people understand and deal with migration. Notwithstanding the extreme elements of those who completely reject migration, and those who believe we should live in the borderless world, there sits the majority, referred to as "The Anxious Middle" (Katwala and Somerville 2016). This group is perhaps categorised as being anxious and confused rather than being hostile. For example, in 2014, 61% of the British public endorsed the view that immigration brings both pressures and economic benefits, but that it should be controlled for the best interests of the country. Given the concerns of the migration issues over the past decade, central government embarked on a series of legal reforms which resonate today. These included The Immigration Act 2014 (Home Office 2014).

### *The Immigration Act 2014*

The preamble to this Act of Parliament is worth noting as it clearly highlights areas of political concern that ushered it in.

*An Act to make provision about the law on immigration and asylum; to make provision about access to services, facilities, licences and work by reference to immigration status; to make provision about the enforcement of certain legislation relating to the labour market; to make provision about language requirements for public sector workers; to make provision about fees for passports and civil registration; and for connected purposes. (Home Office 2016)*

This Act implemented a number of policies outlined in the Conservative Party Manifesto. The Act contained mainly measures to tackle illegal working, enhance the enforcement of labour market rules, deny illegal migrants' access to services including housing and banking, provide new powers for immigration officers, as well as other measures to improve the security and operation of the immigration system. The purpose of the Act was therefore to tackle illegal immigration by making it harder to live and work illegally in the United Kingdom. The intention behind the Act was that without access to work, illegal migrants will depart voluntarily, but where they did not, the Act contained other measures to support enforced removals.

This Act was therefore a central component of reforms under the then coalition government, fuelled by growing concerns surrounding immigration, and the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). This party had won 23% of the national vote in the 2013 local elections (BBC 2013), by tapping into public concern about immigration. The then government decided to introduce this legislation, in order to create a 'hostile environment' for unauthorised immigrants. The Act imposed restrictions on unauthorised access to services such as opening accounts at banks, obtaining diverse licenses or accessing privately rented housing by making it mandatory to check applicant's immigration status. Since that time there have been a series of measures to reinforce the "hostile environment approach". It is against this background that this issue of safety and security of migrants in the country is considered.

This Act was subsequently followed by the Immigration Act 2016 (Home Office 2016) which made provision regarding the law on immigration and asylum; access to services, facilities, licences and work by reference to immigration status; provision about the enforcement of certain legislation relating to the labour market; made provision about language requirements for public sector workers; and made provision about fees for passports and civil registration.

Therefore, the key changes in the law relating to migrants was as follows:

- Employers who hired illegal migrants and the workers themselves face criminal sanctions.
- Migrants who did not have permission to be in the UK had certain privileges revoked. For example, their bank accounts were frozen and their driver's license seized.
- It would be a criminal offence for a landlord to knowingly rent premises to an illegal migrant. If found guilty, the landlord could face up to five years in prison.

The Government's so-called 'deport first, appeal later' scheme was extended to all migrants (before it only applied to convicted criminals with no residency rights or to those people the Secretary of State considered it 'conducive to the public good' to remove). This means that any migrant that had made a human rights or asylum claim could now be removed to their home country pending the outcome of their appeal against the decision to remove them. That is, unless such removal would cause them 'serious, irreversible harm'.

- Pregnant women could now only be detained by immigration authorities for up to 72 hours (or one week with special permission).
- Arrangements were to be to relocate unaccompanied refugee children from other countries in Europe to the UK.

In addition to these Acts of Parliament, government policy extended to more overt attempts to remove those illegal immigrants. The then Home Secretary, Theresa May, for example, instituted a policy which saw motor vans driving around London, exhorting illegal immigrants to go home or face arrest and deportation. The photograph below illustrates one of these vans.



*(Source the Guardian 2019)*

The vehicles, which were driven around six London boroughs with areas of high migration, became notorious as part of May's "hostile environment" strategy aiming to crack down on illegal immigration. It has been reported however, that this policy was not successful with only 11 people surrendering themselves to the authorities (BBC 2013)

As can be seen, the recent legislation and government policies in England and Wales regarding illegal migrants is intended to make it harder for them to live, work and settle into the country, by making it impossible for them to legally work or hold bank accounts etc. The Acts of

Parliament are clearly designed to create the so called 'hostile environment', but this may have unintended consequences for those legal immigrants in this country. One of these consequences may be the rise in recorded hate crime.

### *Hate Crime*

It is of course, the first duty of the state to protect all of its citizens from harm, and to maintain their well-being. Subsequent to the introduction of legislation to make the country a hostile environment for illegal immigrants, which originally crept into immigrant with legal status, there were claims and counterclaims regarding this topic during the so called Brexit debates.

Against this political backcloth the reality for legal migrants appears to have been one of increased persecution (Cuerden and Rogers 2017), with increased abuse and violence especially at times of international terrorist activity.

Measuring such activity in the UK is difficult because the only administrative faculty for capturing such data is the recording of an offence known as 'Hate Crime'. However, this activity only becomes a 'crime' if it is found to be that discrimination was a motive. The most commonly used definition of Hate Crime is:

*"Any criminal offence, perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person's race or perceived race."* (Home Office 2003)

Such is the seriousness of this offence that the power of this Act of Parliament enables an increase in the sentence imposed upon a guilty person of up to 50%. Despite what appears to be a clear cut definition for recording purposes, defining hate crime is a complex task. The first problem relates to the word 'hate' and what is exactly meant by this term. Does it include such emotions as prejudice, bias, bigotry, anger or just mere aversion to others? Of course, it could mean all of these things. In addition, relying purely on official figures as a measure can also be fraught with danger. Not all incidents, for example, are reported to the police or other agencies for example. Despite this, official statistics record five central strands of hate crime:

- race or ethnicity
- religion or beliefs
- sexual orientation
- disability and
- transgender identity

As a general overview, in 2018/19 there was an increase of 10% recorded hate crimes in England and Wales compared with the 2017/18 figures, a continuation of a trend that has seen current recorded instances double that of 2012/13 (Home Office 2019). The majority of hate crimes recorded were race hate crimes, accounting for some 78,991 offences.

Of these recorded offences, the majority involved the use of violence or public order type incidents (Police Recorded Crime, Home Office 2019). Clearly whilst not all hate crimes perpetrated against the race of an individual involve immigrants, but immigrants would have been the target of increasing hostility, given the legislative and political backcloth.

Notwithstanding the clear criminal activities perpetuated against immigrants, there are several other areas of concern for individuals living in this 'hostile' environment created by Act of Parliament. For example, there are women living in England and Wales whose immigration status means they are more vulnerable to abuse and less likely to access support, advocacy and criminal justice measures. Migrant women, for example, are disproportionately at risk from gendered violence, 'honour based' violence, forced marriage and trafficking (HMIC 2015). Migrant women also experience higher rates of domestic homicide and need specialist support (EHRC 2018). However, those services appear to be reduced. Successive immigration policies and the 'hostile environment' exacerbate this risk, creating a context in which women are more vulnerable to violence, whilst at the same time making them less able to access specialist support, public services or justice (EVAW UK 2019).


This appears in contradiction to the Istanbul Convention, which requires victims of violence against women and girls to be protected regardless of their immigration status. However, the so called 'hostile environment' increases the fear and unwillingness of women subject to immigration status and control to disclose abuse. This is because the woman has to balance their need to access shelter, the police or a doctor against a fear that their own or their family residency status could be impacted or questioned. The 'hostile environment' policy, has extended immigration control into many more areas of public and private life, with consequences for those immigrants, not just illegally in the country, but those legally here as well.

#### *Migrants and community integration*

Migrants are constantly building ties in new places as well as negotiating existing long-distance ties. (Ryan and D'Angelo 2018). However, immigration impact upon the economic and labour markets as well as service provision. New migrants typically settle in disadvantaged and deprived neighbourhoods often characterised by poor housing, high levels of unemployment limited and over stretched service provision and poor local amenities (Robinson 2010). Living in close proximity to people from the same country of origin or from shared ethnic or religious background can help limit integration problems.

Many large towns and cities have seen this change, nowhere more so than in Peterborough in Cambridgeshire. In the past decade 24,000 immigrants moved into this city. That is more than one in eight of the population and reflected the trend for Polish and other workers to come to England and Wales. The accession of the eight new member states (A8 – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary) to the European Union on 1 May 2004 has resulted in significant migration within Europe in recent years. The UK, as well as Ireland and Sweden, granted A8 nationals free access to the labour market immediately after the EU enlargement due to severe labour market shortages, mainly in low-wage and low-skill occupations in construction, hospitality, transport sectors and public services (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2006). Freedom of movement attracted many Polish people, especially the young, affected by high rates of unemployment, low wages and lack of opportunities in Poland (White 2010). These newly arrived migrants constituted the largest group from the A8 countries entering Britain. Between 2003 and 2010, the Polish-born population of the UK increased from 75,000 to 532,000 (ONS 2011a). It was estimated that in 2015 the most common non-British nationality was Polish, with 916,000 residents (16.5 per cent of the

total non-British national population resident in the UK) (ONS 2015), although this data does not record the length of stay and there is a limited knowledge of how many have left the UK. According to 2011 census data, Polish migrants have the highest birth rate amongst other migrant groups (ONS 2011b), and Polish language has become the most commonly spoken non-native language in England and Wales (ONS 2011c). The graph below illustrates this growth in Peterborough.



Source (ONS 2019)

Many of these immigrants were Polish but eastern Europeans were not the only group who have migrated to Peterborough in large numbers. In the last decade nearly 5,000 people born in Pakistan made their home in the city, compared with more than 6,500 from Poland.

This fear of the other is a well-documented phenomenon (see for example Witcombe 2018). In Peterborough the growth of the migrant population has fuelled enmity against some seen as ‘the other’ (BBC News 2016). Negative media reporting on migration can influence local opinion and fuel tensions, especially in places already facing challenge through disinvestment, welfare reform and economic restructuring (Spencer 2006).

In addition, the view of many is that migrants are more likely to receive favourable treatment than those born in England and Wales. In a report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, for example, people believed that immigrants brought some benefits economically to the country but complained that they were given unfair priority for housing, employment and social benefits (Joseph Rowntree 2009).

Some migrants classed as refugees also experience difficulties. Employment rates among refugees increased from 34% eight months after their asylum decision to 49% at 21 months.

More than half of the new refugees who were employed at 21 months felt overqualified for their jobs. Refugees aged 54-plus faced greater barriers to integration, in particular with respect to their language skills and their ability to improve these skills

The problem lies perhaps in our lack of understanding of migrant's experiences, social interactions, putting down roots and forming communities. Migrants, through their visibility, presence and social practices help to recast communities in which they settle, thus promoting transformation of the community itself (Portes 2000). Unfortunately, this in turn may produce a 'push back' from traditional communities. Restructuring communities can be seen as problematic, especially in urban areas that have not succeeded in restructuring in the face of this kind of change, more so in the area of economics, where migrants skills and cultural heritages are not highly valued, where opportunities for integration are more restricted (Bean et al 2012).

However, place making has long been seen by migrant populations as an essential strategic response to alienation, isolation and indifference towards newcomers. Culturally dissimilar groups find it difficult to develop social bonds upon which trust relies (Goodhart 2004). And immigration and the diversity it invokes can affect the views of both newcomers and those already resident (Putnam 2007).

There is an increasingly consensual view within academia and policy circles that ethnically diverse communities are characterised by distrust, low levels of esteem and social cohesion and disputes regarding the equitable provision of public goods and services (Sturgis et al 2014). However, one measure of security and safety could be the confidence by migrants that the police would guarantee their rights, safety and their security, and that the police would respond accordingly to the needs and concerns of migrants.

Research by Bradford et al (2017) utilising the data from the England and Wales crime surveys over a three-year period found the following general findings:

- Trust in the police in England and Wales was on average higher amongst immigrants to the UK than among the UK born population
- Trust in the police was higher among people who lived in areas with larger immigrant populations
- Immigrants seem more inclined than others to indicate a belief that the police do have the right intentions and are competent in the roles assigned to them.

Of course, the reasons behind these findings may be complex but it could be that the police in the UK have a strong 'brand' image with a possible world-wide reach. The image of the British bobby on the beat, fairness and equity may provide a basic assumption for people who have recently arrived in the UK. It may also be that recent arrivals compare their perceptions of UK police with police from a different country where their attitudes towards the populace may be entirely different. For migrants in England and Wales it is clear that community contacts and integration appears to be the two facets that go some way to promoting safety and wellbeing. In order to assist in this process, migrants utilise volunteer support networks. One such network is the Migrant Support group.

### *Support networks in community*

Migrant support is a registered charity whose aims include the promotion of social inclusion for the public benefit among migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, who are socially excluded on the grounds of their social and economic position: by identifying needs and where necessary providing support for migrants to advance their education, promote their health and well-being and relieve financial hardship: and by educating the public to promote greater acceptance and understanding of migrants and their contribution to British society. This support group is just one of many who have more or less the same aims and objectives, that of integration.

Their main activities involve the use of integration hubs; provision of English language and British life - in the UK sessions; employability support, it and job club, wellbeing activities such as football sessions and walking clubs. Volunteering opportunities and information and advice drop in. The charity also runs a media project called migrant echoes aimed to encourage people from migrant background to share their experiences. However, support networks may need to be tailored to the individuals or groups concerned. Work by Burhott et al (2017) showed that the distribution of support networks varied across ethnic groups and that support is not a continuum and that there are different elements (communalism, familism, filial piety, and acculturation) that may impact on the configuration of support networks and their effectiveness.

### *Concluding thoughts*

It would appear that populist support for right wing political parties has in part fuelled government responses to illegal immigration through the introduction of Acts of Parliament and policies that intend to make it harder for individuals to enter this country. However, this 'hostile environment' approach to dealing with such issues could have played a part in legal migrants suffering from an increase in hate crime and abuse in public. Legal immigrants in England and Wales, on the whole, tend to live and work together in areas where they interact with each other and provide safety and social networking. This should of course come as no surprise as research supports this approach in many countries. However, research into their wellbeing and safety, as victims of particular crimes etc. is difficult to judge in part to the nature of the way that crimes are recorded in England and Wales. Hence the major barometer for judging levels of crime against migrants is the number of Hate Crime figures recorded. In addition, the government's policy of integration of migrant communities into society means that migrant victims of crime may be regarded as 'normal citizens', rather than being a special category of victim, requiring different needs. If this is the case, then government policy regarding crime and safety of migrants in England and Wales needs to be revisited, in order that they are protected against racial stereotyping and race-based criminality.

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# The art of spreading

## Spreading policies in the Netherlands as a solution segregation and crime

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### *Introduction: Living and living together*

Since the 1970s spreading of individuals and communities in the Netherlands is considered as a solution to combat crime and nuisance and at the same time as an instrument to promote the integration of new population groups. The Special Measures for Metropolitan Problems Act, which was introduced in 2006, also known as the Rotterdam Act, is the most recent example of this. Even before 2006, the policies of spreading were often conducted in less formal ways.

A spreading policy cannot be viewed separately from other policy instruments that the government can use to reduce crime and nuisance in relation to housing. Living in a densely populated country like the Netherlands constantly raises questions about how people relate to each other. This varies from minor irritations, neighbors' quarrels, noise nuisance, petty crime to social anxiety for each other even when they are not living together in the same neighborhood. Where different groups live in the same social space, a social group dynamic is created that is aimed at conforming to the group norm. This happens spontaneously, but that does not mean that this is a conflict-free process. Where social cohesion and adaptation do not proceed spontaneously or move in an undesirable direction (ghettos or closed communities), the government can influence this process, for instance by deploying neighborhood workers, by the concept of community policing or by empowerment through citizen participation. Active intervention in housing by the government can also be used as an instrument to improve the quality of life and safety in neighborhoods. By actively steering the housing stock, the government can influence the composition of the population. In the development of new neighborhoods, the Dutch government has set standards for the construction of social rental housing. Newly build neighborhoods are therefore a mix of rental and owner-occupied homes. The idea is that through a varied housing offer and a mix of social housing and private property in various rental and price ranges it is possible to counteract a one-sided population composition and the chance of segregation. It is also worth mentioning that the government is involved in urban renewal and urban renovation. The purpose of these efforts is not only the improvement of the quality of life in neighborhoods, but also to retain wealthy people in the neighborhood.

These interventions are not undisputed, as is the policy of actively spreading. Both are regularly associated with discrimination. There is also a difference of opinion about the effects of this policy. Nevertheless, the possibility of spreading people has received increasing support. The question is always what is permissible and what is considered legitimate by the population. The degree of legitimacy is highly dependent on the spirit of the age, the political and social climate and the views on integration. Actively spreading the population is part of this discussion. In this article we outline the history of this policy, with an accent on safety and criminal behavior. In addition, we ask ourselves two questions: with what intentions was the

spreading policy developed and implemented and what are the advantages and disadvantages of this policy? This article is based on literature and document research.

### *1972 – Spreading as a solution*

The riots in the Afrikaanderwijk in the summer of 1972 are generally regarded as the starting point for an actively spreading policy. The cause of the riots was the increasing discontent among its residents. The Afrikaanderwijk was one of the many old traditionally working-class neighborhoods, built at the beginning of the twentieth century. Many of its residents had lived here all their lives. The older generation had and experienced the hardships of the German occupation and the bombing and destruction of the inner-city of Rotterdam in 1940. These neighborhoods were characterized as homogeneous. Social cohesion and social control were strong. The houses were wanted. At the beginning of the 1970s there was still a major housing shortage in the Netherlands. Although new neighborhoods were built on the outskirts of the cities in the 1950s, the housing stock was still insufficient to meet the growing demand for the baby boomer generation. Therefore, the pressure on these working-class neighborhoods was great (Van der Wal, 2011).

From the second half of the 1960s a new group of home seekers joined the housing market. These were the guest workers. Like the housing shortage, this was not only a Rotterdam problem but a national problem. At the end of the 1950s the booming Dutch economy caused labor market shortages. To alleviate these shortages guest workers were hired in Southern Europe. When the economy in their home countries grew, they left. Their place was taken by workers from Morocco and Turkey. With the support of the Dutch government companies recruited large numbers of unskilled labor from these countries. The idea was that they would only work in the Netherlands temporarily (Lucassen, 2018; Chin, 2017).

The receiving of the guest workers was entrusted to the companies who hired them. The government did not consider it his responsibility to interfere with the living conditions of the guest workers. The police only checked working papers in the context of the Aliens Act and the fire brigade checked on fire safety. In many cases the receiving was inadequate, as was later concluded in various government reports. The guest workers were mostly housed in guest houses, usually large buildings that were divided into small rooms where several guest workers lived together. Because of the many guest workers, private house owners also saw opportunities to rent out accommodation. This also happened in the working-class neighborhoods, where houses or apartments were rented to guest workers. That caused tensions. The already sparse housing was now rented out to guest workers, to the dismay of the original residents. But it was not only competition in the housing market that disturbed them. In their perception, the guest workers had a bad influence on the neighborhood. They caused nuisance and brought crime. Women felt unsafe and no longer dared to go out alone. In Rotterdam the unrest increased at the beginning of the seventies, when Turks themselves bought houses and rented them out to fellow countrymen. The concentration of these guest workers was strongest in the Afrikaanderwijk. In a current affairs program, former residents of one of the homes now owned by a Turkish landlord, told a reporter how they were intimidated to cancel their rent so that their homes could be rented to other Turks. Residents wanted the municipal authorities to put an end to the influx of foreigners into their neighborhoods. They

had the feeling that the municipal authorities were passing on the problems to the old neighborhoods. They demanded an immediate halt to the "concentration of foreigners in the working-class neighborhoods" and they wanted the authorities and employers to inform foreign workers properly about their rights and duties (AVRO-Televizier, 1972). The municipal authorities were asked to spread the guest workers equally across the city with a maximum of two guest houses in every street. In doing so, they pointed to the growing problems of poverty, nuisance and crime and made the comparison with the American ghettos and the riots that had taken place there in the second half of the 1960s (Van der Wal, 2011).

The municipality was reluctant to actively spread people around the city. In her eyes, this is an unorthodox measure. In order to meet the residents' grievances, she adapted the guest-house regulation and closed a number of illegal guesthouses. This was insufficient for the residents. In the neighborhood, the relationship between original residents and the Turks deteriorated. When an incident occurred in August 1972 between a Turkish landlord and a Dutch tenant, the bomb burst. The residents took the law into their own hands. They formed an assault squad team that invaded one of the guest houses and threw the entire household on the street. This triggered a riot that lasted almost a week. Young people went into battle with the police every night and caused major destruction in the neighborhood. Only after five days did the police regain control of the neighborhood.

When the storm calmed down, the municipality was blamed for not having responded sufficiently to the complaints of the residents. Initially, she narrowed the problem to the accommodation of guest workers. She announced a stricter control of the guest houses. But that wasn't enough for the residents. The Social Democrats stood up for the neighborhood residents and found that guesthouses should be proportionally spread over the town, so that "the social psychological climate of one neighborhood was not burdened more heavily than that of other neighborhoods." Eventually, a proposal was made for a quota of the number of foreigners per neighborhood. No more than five percent of foreigners were allowed to settle in a neighborhood. That percentage was equal to the percentage of foreigners who lived in Rotterdam at that time. The groups that fell under the quota were Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians, Surinamese and Antilleans. This measure was to prevent that the balance between the different population groups should be disturbed. Witte, who researched ethnic violence in the Netherlands, found that the pursuit of active spreading was primarily a response to xenophobia in the working-class neighborhoods. With regard to the Rotterdam spreading policy, the municipal authorities would have been guided by the tolerance threshold theory. This theory presupposes that every society cannot receive more than a certain number of foreigners. That would mean that conflicts between ethnic groups could only be prevented by limiting immigration or by spreading the migrant population. From that point of view, the Rotterdam spreading policy was intended to prevent problems between population groups. According to Witte, the idea of spreading was born out of the xenophobia of the neighborhood residents and the constant pressure they exerted on the municipality. The fear of foreigners was ignored by the new policy. That made the Rotterdam measure into a scientific alibi to justify the supposed impossibility of the coexistence of cultures (Witte, 2010).

The Rotterdam spreading policy was therefore controversial. Opponents of an active spreading policy organized protests and labeled the measure as discrimination and racism. The measure was therefore challenged and in 1974 it was annulled by the Raad van State, the highest administrative court.

#### *Mixed housing and re-education of families and indirect spreading policies*

The situation in Rotterdam was not new, although it had never before occurred in this form. The structural exclusion of families from a certain neighborhood because of their behavior has a long history and goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Due to industrialization, many Dutch inner cities were struggling with an accumulation of poor working-class families. These people were dependent on rental properties. These were mainly rented out by private landlords and many of them acted as slumlords. The houses were poorly maintained, and the living conditions were often miserable. Under pressure from social liberals and social democrats, a series of social legislation came into being around 1900, which was often meant to protect the lower classes. The motives for these laws were a mixture of humanity and social anxiety. Regarding the last factor, the idea was that a large concentration of poverty could lead to social discontent and riotous behavior. One of the social laws was the Housing Act, which was adopted in 1901. This law made it possible to build social housing project with a government subsidy. Housing corporations were founded throughout the country and in the 1910s the first new neighborhoods were built. Many of these projects were based on the garden city concept of the British architect Ebenezer Howard. The housing corporations were a product of the pillarization, a typical Dutch phenomenon. The pillarization divided Dutch society into a Catholic, a Protestant and a Social Democratic pillar, each with their own organizations, including housing corporations. These housing corporations only built for their own constituency, based on membership. The building projects mainly consisted of social housing. During this period, the municipalities also started to implement social housing projects themselves. What they both had in mind were pleasant, livable neighborhoods, with strong social cohesion and the resulting social control. This soon meant that there was no room for families who deviated from the prevailing standard. These were generally weak social families, which, according to the housing corporations, showed deviant or even criminal behavior. One speaks of non-social or anti-social families. In collaboration with the municipalities separate provisions were made for these families. They had to be re-educated and that is why so-called rehabilitation houses were established in several municipalities. These facilities varied in size depending on the size of the target group and the size of the town and were isolated from the city (Dercksen & Verplanke, 1999).

The families in the rehabilitation houses received social support. Social workers checked their lifestyle, the hygiene of the family and the income and expenses. Several of these housing complexes were fenced and, given the strict and intensive supervision, there was hardly any privacy. The system was well-intentioned, but in practice it had many imperfections. During the crisis of the 1930s, the residential schools often turned into a shelter for families who mainly had financial problems caused by unemployment.

In the 1960s, the system of rehabilitation houses became less popular. It was considered a paternalistic approach. Isolation and re-education of families were seen as derogatory and

stigmatizing. Above all, the results of the re-education were disappointing, insofar as they were also measurable. Eventually the remaining projects were canceled and from now on the families were individually guided by social workers (Dercksen & Verplanke, 1999).

In a certain sense the rehabilitation houses were an instrument of spreading, separating families that were classified as anti-social from decent neighborhoods. Canceling these facilities did not put an end to it in practice. Spreading as an instrument for a harmonious and balanced spatial distribution of the population was still in use. Sometimes this happened under the direction of local authorities, sometimes under the direction of the housing corporations. Families with a history of criminal or anti-social behavior were excluded. On the basis of the housing policies at the time, in which the housing corporations were often able to operate autonomously and act selectively, these families were not allocated rental housing from the corporation. They were often referred to the municipal rental properties. As a result, concentrations of vulnerable and anti-social families were emerging in certain neighborhoods. These families, in turn, attracted other family members to the neighborhood, so that the concentration of deprived residents grew. Some local authorities recognized a pragmatic benefit. Antisocial families lived together in one neighborhood and as a result the municipality kept the overview. That happened, for example, in Gouda, the municipality housed the families refused by the housing corporations on a square in the neighborhood Kort Haarlem. Among them were families from the caravan dwellers community. The square soon got a bad name. The families dominated their environment and were involved in illegal activities. The square was transformed in a kind of fortress (Van der Wal, 2010). In his study of Broekhoven, a neighborhood in the city of Tilburg, Tops gives a similar picture of these relocations. From the end of the 1960s the local authorities deliberately placed certain families together in this neighborhood. Among them were families caravan dweller community. There were signs of intimidation and benevolent families were bullied out of the neighborhood. The result was a concentration of families whose adults were mostly unemployed and dependent on benefits and subsidies. Family members were active in crime and illegal activities such as fraud. Cars were scrapped on the street. The neighborhood deteriorated. There was a great deal of mistrust of the local authorities. The police was chased out of the neighborhood several times, police cars were put on their side (Tops, 2018). If they used police dogs, the residents would take their own dogs out. Here we saw the dark side of spreading.

Ethnicity played a role in Amsterdam. This was apparent from a black book published by an action committee called the Overleggroep Pensions in 1976 with the title *Closed neighborhoods*. According to this committee, eight neighborhoods in the capital were sealed off for Surinamese, Antilleans and guest workers. Here too, it were the housing corporations that determined the distribution of housing. Around the mid-1970s they were confronted with a growing number of Surinamese home seekers, who were migrating to the Netherlands because of the impending independence of this Dutch colony. They feared tensions in the Amsterdam neighborhoods and wanted to prevent concentrations. This fear was reinforced by the situation in the Glijphoeve flat in the new Amsterdam south east / Bijlmermeer neighborhood where a large number of Surinamese people lived together. In that flat, ten to fifteen percent of the homes were assigned to Surinamese families. That percentage grew to eighty

when in 1974 a large part of the remaining houses were squatted by a Surinamese action group. There was talk of a poor living condition. According to critics, there was talk of destruction, nuisance and deviating living standards. In some cases, twelve to fifteen people lived in one five-room home. Due to the situation in the Gliphoeve, housing associations became convinced that concentrations of certain communities had to be prevented. That was the main reason for the criticized policy of the housing corporations. They did not rent out properties from their own housing stock in these neighborhoods to the aforementioned groups. Nuisance and crime played a role in this measure. The action committee was convinced that the municipality of Amsterdam also supported the distribution policy. In the black book it wrote:

The mayor and aldermen strive to spread ethnic minorities, both in Amsterdam and out of town. In practice this means that the aim is not to house more than one family of an ethnic minority per staircase (in apartment blocks) (Overleggroep Pensions, 1975).

This attitude and the policies of the Amsterdam housing corporations and of the municipality such as the makers of the black book stated that there was exclusion and discrimination. This aspect always came back when the option of spreading was mentioned. In the socially liberal climate that prevailed in the Netherlands during the seventies, eighties and nineties, a forced spreading of people on the basis of their ethnic or social origin was extremely sensitive. That was also the reason why the majority of the local authorities and politicians were reluctant to implement this measure.

### *Caravan dwellers and travelers*

Despite all sensitivity and criticism there was one community for which a specific housing policy had been developed. These were the caravan dwellers, among them travelers, Sinti and Roma gypsies. This community had its own culture and a strong sense of identity. They traveled through the country with their caravans. The group had a bad reputation and was often associated with illegal and criminal activities. In order to combat the nuisance, the government already adopted the Caravan Act in 1918, which “had to protect society against the risks of a migrant population, which was in very poor economic and environmental conditions, thereby threatening public order and health.” Several municipalities set up camps where caravan dwellers could stay. This measure was primarily intended to limit the freedom of movement of the group. At the same time this measure was intended to reduce the number of caravans (Overbekking, 2006). This intention did not change. After the German Occupation, the government still preferred the caravan camps to disappear. In the context of social integration, it wanted to place caravan dwellers in regular homes. This met with resistance in the caravan community. They referred to the period of the German Occupation when Roma and Sinti were systematically persecuted. This made it difficult to discuss a specific spreading or housing policy. Because of the often poor living conditions in most of the camps, the government decided around the mid-1960s to set up large regional caravan centers. As a result, she also respected the cultural individuality of the caravan dwellers. Several of these centers had already been set up in the south of the Netherlands, in the province of Noord-Brabant. The camps were provided with facilities such as plumbing, electricity, community centers and schools. Each camp also received a ward nurse, a policeman, and a camp chaplain. Again, this new policy was partly aimed at limiting the increase in the number of caravans. In a certain sense, the

government unwillingly promoted the closed character of the caravan dweller community. In the long run this would have problematic consequences. 52 caravan centers were to be installed throughout the Netherlands, each with 70 pitches for caravans (Godrie-Van Gils, 2018).

The camps were remote from the built-up areas of many municipalities and were often fenced. They were literally shielded from the outside world. The supervision on the camps was limited. The centers quickly became overcrowded. The caravan dwellers lived close together, which was a reason for mutual tensions. In addition, the facilities for such a large number of people often proved insufficient. Many residents were unemployed and were looking for other means of livelihood. As a result, the centers soon turned into gathering places for illegal and criminal activities, such as the trade and scrapping of stolen cars, handling of stolen goods, the cultivation and production of hemp/cannabis, benefit fraud, etc. In fact, all the problems were swept together in these camps as families with a criminal history were housed in the same caravan center. More and more, the large centers also became hiding places for criminals, who were often not themselves caravan dwellers, but who found shelter there (Godrie-Van Gils, 2018). Crime became normal at these camps. The growth of crime was attributed to traditions. For generations members of these communities were concerned with poaching, smuggling to Belgium and bootlegging. The moral climate was low, partly due to the isolated position. The attitude towards the government was harsh. The residents felt stigmatized and discriminated against. Due to the rising tensions, the professionals in the camps lost control of the residents. They withdrew, making supervision and enforcement even more relaxed (Van Leiden et al., 2014).

In the 1970s, the government realized that the situation was uncontrollable and unmanageable. The large camps had to be dismantled. Instead, they wanted smaller camps. Not only many caravan dwellers opposed this new policy. The municipalities were also opposed to this policy shift. They remained an advocate of the larger camps. In their eyes spreading these families was similar to spreading the problems they caused. Due to the hesitant attitude of many municipal authorities, little changed for the time being. As a result of this the problems worsened. In the 1980s, several larger caravan centers had therefore become sanctuaries for all kinds of criminality, no-go areas where even the police no longer dared to show themselves. If she did, it often happened with large equipment and hundreds of police officers and riot police (Van Leiden et al., 2014).

The implementation of a new policy took a lot of time. It was not until the 1990s that a change occurred, when many caravan dwellers left the large centers and settled in the smaller centers or moved into an ordinary house. This new policy also included small centers with a maximum of ten caravans that were situated in the middle of residential areas. So instead of isolation the authorities started to stimulate integration. A number of large centers continued to exist and retained their status as a sanctuary. Due to a persistent lack of enforcement and supervision, the problem of crime and illegality was able to expand further at those camps. According to several criminologists, this has contributed to the fact that several caravan families have become major players in organized crime. Some of them are (international) key players in the production and trade of synthetic drugs. Where they were once experts in

bootlegging, they now use this expertise to produce XTC (Van Leiden et al., 2014; Moors & Spapens, 2017). The dismantling of the few remaining large caravan centers after the turn of the century has changed this situation.

### *Divide and rule*

In Rotterdam, around the turn of the century, people still believed that a policy of spreading could offer a solution to the problems that many disadvantaged neighborhoods faced. By that time, the socio-political climate had changed dramatically. The free social-liberal climate of the 1970s was eroding. This had an effect on thinking about themes such as safety and integration. The social scientist Boutellier explained the need for more security from rising crime - which had increased more than ten times since the early 1960s -, from the social changes that had led to a vitalist culture - by the sociologist Bauman referred to as the liquid society in which many social guarantees of citizens were taken - , and from a government that manifested itself more and more in the security field. Boutellier also saw a shift in the security policy where the former approach based on criminal law changed more and more in an approach based on administrative law. With regard to the latter, the municipalities increasingly played an important role in this approach and new safety partners were involved in this policy, such as welfare work, housing corporations, and residents' associations (Bouttelier, 2005; Bauman, 2012). The term "quality of life" was also introduced at the end of the twentieth century. Neighborhoods not only had to be safe but also livable.

Livability and safety nowhere seemed to play such a major role as in Rotterdam. The Tarwewijk, a neighborhood in the southern part of the city, became a symbol of the problems in the disadvantaged neighborhoods. The population had changed dramatically since the 1970s. Middle incomes had moved away, and the houses were mainly rented to disadvantaged people, many of them were so-called newcomers, mostly non-western immigrants and East European guest workers. Social cohesion eroded and as a result of this diversity and the lack of integration, social control was minimal. This neighborhood got the image of a no-go area, normalization of crime and addiction problems. Slumlording, illegal subletting and fraud were also part of daily life in this area (Litjens, 2016). At the end of the nineties, the problems escalated. Drug trafficking in particular took on increasing proportions. Gun violence and knife crime were significant. The mayor and the police responded with preventive body searches.

A research into the source of these problems by Engbersen et al. showed that in the Rotterdam neighborhoods where relatively many low-income households, migrants and benefit recipients lived, there was a concentration of nuisance and crime. Research in the Delfshaven district showed that people who had few incomes were looking for other ways to make money. Some of them earned their money through illegal or informal means. Snel warned about the emergence of a parallel society (Snel et al., 1998).

The problems left a mark on the city and paved the way for the emergence of a new local party led by flamboyant politician Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered in 2002. The party operated under the name *Leefbaar Rotterdam* (Liveable Rotterdam) and appealed to the growing sense of insecurity of many people in Rotterdam. In 2002, the party won 36 percent of the vote in the local elections. That made Liveable Rotterdam the largest party in the city. This

led to a regime change in that city with a strong focus on security. The city got its own alderman for security, formerly an exclusive task of the mayor. Rotterdam grew into a testing ground for a new safety approach. From that perspective, the idea of spreading became attractive again. It was discussed in a policy paper called Rotterdam vooruit! that was published in 2003. The statistical bureau of the municipality had calculated that the original Dutch population in Rotterdam would only decrease in the coming years. The largest influx was non-Western immigrant residents, people that were far from the Rotterdam average in socio-economic development, language, culture and religion. The policy paper concluded:

This means that for a large proportion of the incoming population, a disadvantage policy must be pursued, with the fact that many disadvantaged groups live concentrated in certain neighborhoods (segregation). If all kinds of segregation (language deficit, educational disadvantage, low income, unemployment, benefit dependency, health problems) exist in one neighborhood at the same time, then we see a decline. The decline of a neighborhood is mainly due to the living environment. And if nuisance and crime prevail, then there is not only a backlog, but also a decline.

A little later in the paper the municipality stated:

The absorption capacity of certain neighborhoods is exceeded by a permanent influx of the underprivileged and the departure of residents who can afford to live elsewhere. Together with the inconvenience, illegality and criminality, that is to us the core of the problem.

This formulation therefore no longer concerned ethnic origin, as was still largely the case in 1974, but mainly the social position of the population. The problem was redefined, as the social geographer Bolt indicated, and this seemed to have reduced the political sensitivity of spreading Bolt, 2004). Later in the policy paper it is also explicitly stated that color was not the problem. But what exactly was understood by underprivileged was not explained. The solution was found in a financial standard. It was proposed that people with an income of less than 120 percent of the minimum wage should no longer be admitted to the Rotterdam housing market. That meant that certain groups could be completely excluded as newcomers to the city.

National legislation was necessary to implement this new policy tool. Here too Rotterdam had the wind in its sails. Fortuyn had not only devoted himself to local but also to national politics. In the elections that were held shortly after his tragic death, the party Lijst Pim Fortuyn won a huge victory. In order to provide a counterbalance to this emerging populism, which includes the Fortuyn party, the Balkenende I cabinet invested heavily in the theme of security. In addition, the city of Rotterdam carried out professional lobbying and succeeded in drawing attention to the problems that played a role in the city. In April 2004, the government presented the first draft law. On 1 January 2006 the Special Measures for Metropolitan Problems Act came into effect. In Rotterdam people persistently spoke of the Rotterdam Act (Tops, 2007).

The law was intended to achieve sustainable improvement of the quality of life in certain neighborhoods or districts. In that context, it was good to allow a vulnerable neighborhood to catch their breath. That was possible through a selective housing allocation, made possible by article four of the new law. In view of a desirable and balanced population structure in disadvantaged neighborhoods, the law allowed municipalities to limit the inflow of vulnerable tenants with weak socio-economic positions in vulnerable streets, neighborhoods or neighborhoods and the inflow of home seekers with nuisance or criminal behavior. The municipality was given the authority to give priority to groups of people on the basis of certain socio-economic characteristics. Finally, the municipality was allowed to expropriate homeowners who were guilty of house milking. The starting point was that by applying this selective housing policy, the municipality could offer the residents more perspective. In that respect, the law broke with the prevailing right to the free choice of home. That is why strict conditions were attached to the granting of the measure. The measure could only be applied if there was a demonstrable accumulation of livability problems in certain residential complexes, streets or areas and the existing measures had insufficient effect. The measure must therefore be necessary, the area to be designated must be appropriate, and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality must be taken into account. A formal request was then presented to the Minister of the Interior, who took the decision to designate the area in question. The implementation of the Special Measures for Metropolitan Problems Act was therefore an ultimate remedy (Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 2004/2005 ). Rotterdam was also the first city to use the law. In March 2006, the minister designated several neighborhoods and streets where the measures could be applied.

The law was criticized. According to its opponents the measures would have a stigmatizing discriminatory effect. After all, being disadvantaged could not be equated with nuisance. According to the critics, ethnicity was seen as a characteristic of the degrading of a neighborhood. They were also critical of the lack of clear indicators. It was unclear what effect concerning the quality of life the municipality wanted to achieve with the measure (Van der Laan et al., 2006). Kleijer-Kool noted that it was more or less a sort of a divide and rule policy. The categorical approach that had dominated Dutch minority policy for many years, aimed at taking away the economic and social disadvantages, shifted to a territorial approach aimed at individuals within disadvantaged groups. The goals were anti-group (Kleijer-Kool, 2008). Duijvendak and Hortulanus pointed to the notion of the so-called dangerous class. People did not want 'group' neighborhoods, but differentiation assessed each resident on group characteristics. The idea of spreading as a means to create a close-knit community with strong social control was at odds with earlier findings that, on the contrary, demonstrated that the degree of mixing said little about the way people lived together. Especially in neighborhoods with a mixed population, the residents were least integrated in their own neighborhood and the mutual contacts were limited (Duijvendak, 1999).

The law was evaluated after five years. The evaluation showed that the law was only applied to a limited extent. Article four, concerning the area of housing market policy in particular, only the municipality of Rotterdam appeared to use the set of instruments. Other municipalities judged the law too harsh in proportion to the seriousness of their own problems or had

not yet set up their organization. In the case of problems concerning livability in areas with a lot of ownership by housing corporations, they opted for housing control by making agreements with the corporations. For example, income requirements were set through the corporations and antecedents could be tested. According to those municipalities, this process was simpler than when the Rotterdam Law was implemented. In neighborhoods with mainly private ownership, this approach did not work. The possibility of expropriating or closing properties was only rarely used.

### *Redevelopment and organized crime*

To tackle the problem of disadvantaged neighborhoods the government in 2007 took the initiative for a drastic approach. Based on criteria drawn up in advance, forty neighborhoods were selected. In these areas a mix of physical, social and economic measures was implemented. The program was subsidized from the Ministry of Housing, Neighborhoods and Integration. The neighborhoods were thoroughly addressed. Outdated homes were renovated, entire streets were demolished and rebuilt. The program was given the name *Krachtwijken* (Power neighborhoods). Once again it gave municipalities and corporations the opportunity to relocate families. They had to leave their home temporarily due to renovation work or new building. In several cases, renovation was accompanied by rent increases, as a result of which the original residents were more or less forced to find accommodation elsewhere. Others choose to move voluntarily (Van den Brink, 2007).

The effects of the approach were measured after five years. In almost all cases, the physical approach - demolition and new construction - led to a more varied supply of housing, reducing the concentrations of weak economic groups. The socio-economic position of a large number of neighborhoods appeared to have improved. Opinions differed about the effects concerning safety. The perception of safety was dependent on more indicators than just physical or socio-economic interventions. That is why it was not possible to make good statements about this (Visitatiecommissie Wijkeraanpak, 2011). In 2015, Tops and Van der Torre stated that the safety of neighborhoods could only improve if the (organized) crime that was present in these neighborhoods was also tackled simultaneously. They referred to the structural and cultural explanations for the emergence and existence of deprived areas. The structural explanation is based on the circumstances in which people live and the lack of social increase. Education, better housing options and employment are considered as solutions. This is also the explanation given by sociologists such as Waquant, Wilson and Kleijer-Kool in the Netherlands (Waquant, 2008; Wilson, 2006; Kleijer-Kool, 2008). The cultural explanation emphasizes an individual lifestyle that has arisen in some areas, including several disadvantaged neighborhoods. Part of the residents can develop their own subculture that is sometimes also directed against the outside world. Tops and Van der Torre indicate that improving physical and socio-economic conditions does not always have to lead to a change in lifestyle. People cherish their own lifestyle, perhaps because they cannot do otherwise, but also because it is familiar and has attractive sides. In addition, these neighborhoods often develop a negative image, which in turn can reinforce deviant behaviour. It is like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Some of these criminals have a positive image for various reasons. Sometimes they act as a benefactor or as a mediator. That creates a bond of reciprocity. People are made dependent. They also benefit

from illegal activities such as the private sale of products like illegal booze or cigarettes or the provision of services that benefit the entire neighborhood. An example of the latter is the sponsorship of local neighborhood associations, primary schools or nearby sports clubs. Unwilling residents are intimidated. Usually there is a mix of these factors. Normalization of criminal behavior occurs in such situations. Crime becomes a means of social increase, to obtain a higher status level. Normalizing this behavior is often accompanied goes hand in hand with a deterioration of morality in these neighborhoods. The current pattern of norms and values pattern is eroding. Many residents distrust the government, which is being challenged in a way. In such neighborhoods people are not inclined to talk to the police (Tops & Van der Torre, 2015; Tops & Tromp, 2017; Lam et al., 2018). In 2019, Tops and Tromp introduced the term "silent neighborhoods" when examining organized crime in Amsterdam. Residents no longer want to share information with the police. In such an environment, criminals and criminal families feel safe. They are seen as untouchables (Tops & Tromp, 2018).

It is these findings that focus the spotlight on the vulnerable and deprived neighborhoods. All this attention for what is now referred to in the Netherlands as 'undermining crime' has grown considerably in recent years. The cultural aspects of crime affect the quality of life in those neighborhoods and are the basis for the debate about the spreading of residents, which now does not focus so much on ethnicity as in the 1970s, but rather on social aspects and criminal history. The number of applications under the Special Measures for Metropolitan Problems Act to safeguard neighborhoods from an influx of deprived or suspect residents is increasing. The safety aspect plays an important role in this. The law was amended in 2016. Added to this is the legal possibility to keep home seekers with a criminal history or persistent anti-social behaviour in the designated areas and thus improve liveability and safety within a broader approach. Moreover, the law can also be used to refuse people who are known to have recruited people for extremist organizations in the past. This can prevent others from radicalizing or starting terrorist activities.

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